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Abstract
The goal of the present paper is to introduce the audience to selected methods (especially 
future scenario-based method) and their usability in predicting future developments 
of a security and operating environment. Furthermore, this paper highlights the place 
of these methods in the process of capability planning and creation of a security and 
defence policy of the state. This paper explores the possibilities, practical applications, 
risks and limitations of using the selected methods in predicting the future development 
of a security and operating environment. 
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Sažetak
Cilj ovoga članka je upoznati čitatelje s odabranim metodama (posebno budućih metoda, 
baziranih na scenarijima), njihovom uporabljivošću u prognoziranju budućeg razvoja 
sigurnosnog i operativnog okružja, kao i ukazivanjem na njihovo mjesto u procesu 
planiranja sposobnosti i stvaranju sigurnosne i obrambene politike države. Članak 
razmatra mogućnosti, praktične primjene, rizike i ograničenja korištenja odabranih 
metoda u predviđanju budućeg razvoja sigurnosnog i operativnog okružja.
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Introduction
Security policy is the most general and all-embracing programme of the state 
in the field of security and defence as well as protecting national interests. 
In order for the state’s security policy to be successful, i.e., maintaining or 
strengthening the position of the state, it must maintain its objectivity and 
rational nature. The state’s security policy should be the most rational (the 
most reasonable) policy of the state, because, in case of its failure, the existence 
of the state is threatened. It is a paradox, however, that in everyday practice, 
this perfectly reasonable policy of the state is built upon the background 
of irrational inputs, permanent lack of information and subjective factors. 
When designing and implementing the security policy, the need for the 
most comprehensive and objective information and inputs into the decision-
making process leads to the analysis not only of the present situation, but 
also the future development of a security environment.
The Role of Methods of Analysis and Prediction of the Security 
Environment in the Process of Creating a Security and Defence 
Policy  
Analysis and prediction of a security and operating environment and the 
resulting security threats and risks are an essential source of information for 
decision making in the field of security and defence policy. Basic outputs of 
such analysis and prediction include:
•	 identification of the threat;
•	 evaluation of risk (as in the scale of the threat) in relation to the 
protected value (reference object) or in relation to the risks of other 
threats;
•	 risk assessment, or deciding whether the risk is acceptable.
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High quality analysis and prediction of development of security and 
operating environment and the resulting security threats and risks is, in 
an optimal case, a prerequisite for selecting and deciding on the creation 
of appropriate security (counter-) measures, continuous improvement and 
raising the level of safety including improvement in capability development. 
It also aids in reducing potential losses and damages resulting from the 
effects of realised threats (see, e.g., Parsons, 2001: p.105). However, when 
making conclusions about the predictions, one should always take into 
account the limiting factors:
•	 probability of fulfilling the prediction decreases depending on the 
availability of information (the more distant the prediction is in 
terms of the future, the less probable it is);
•	 it is impossible to rule out unexpected and unpredictable events 
that can make the prediction worthless (‘black swans’);
•	 conclusions of even the best analysis and prediction have no 
chance of being used when implementing a security policy, if this is 
significantly influenced by other partial factors and interests.
Basic Characteristics of Plausible Qualitative Methods
Because there are many ways and methods that can be applied when analysing 
the development of a security and operating environment, selection of 
appropriate methods is very important. The approach must be appropriate 
for the situation, objectives and context in which the analysis is conducted. 
Each approach and each method of risk assessment has its advantages and its 
shortcomings. Selecting the appropriate approach and appropriate method 
are dependent on the purpose of the performed evaluation, nature of the 
available data, availability of funds, and often also socio-political context. 
Although the major obstacle in analysing and predicting the evolution of a 
security and operating environment and the resulting security threats, risks 
and missions of military is generally the lack of data and information, or lack 
of ability to select relevant and valid information, it is also important to select 
appropriate methods and analytic procedures. According to Grasseová-
Motyčková (2016: p.33), in principle, two general types of methods are 
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used in analysing and predicting security threats – qualitative methods and 
quantitative methods.
Qualitative methods are applicable in cases where there are no “hard data” 
available or the analysed problems are too complex, interrelated and difficult 
to describe using the quantified data. Basic procedures used in qualitative 
methods are based on experience, reasoning and expert opinions. This is 
a typical feature of a qualitative approach to research, which is not based 
on reliable, objective and complete data, and permanently applicable laws, 
but rather on experience and subjective intuition of experts. Qualitative 
procedures are either exploratory or normative. Exploratory methods are 
based on information about the past and the present, and apply heuristic 
approaches towards the future (often by studying possible scenarios or 
alternatives futures), so that the resulting forecast answers the questions: 
what could the next development be and what events or phenomena may 
occur in the future? On the contrary, normative forecast starts with future 
targets (e.g., ensuring a certain degree of protection for specific values), 
and returns back from this future starting point to the present, identifying 
what resources and technologies are necessary to attain these targets and 
what constraints must be eliminated. This approach, however, is a minority 
approach not only in the Czech Republic but also in general (see, e.g., Frank, 
2015: p.282).
According to Ritz (2001), typical qualitative methods of analysis and 
prediction of security threats and risks and impact of future evolutions in the 
operating environment or technological trends include the so-called naive 
extrapolation (naive extrapolation starts from the simplified assumption that 
the future development and status of the risk is actually a simple extension of 
the results of the present situation), consensus forecasts, the Delphi panel (or 
the Delphi method), analogy or historical analogy (prediction uses historical 
knowledge and based on the findings of identical elements and features 
between the already known and the researched phenomenon, it assumes a 
similar mechanism of development in the future by comparison of the two).
Major advantages of qualitative methods include mainly the possibility 
of selection and aggregation of large amounts of information and its 
73
Scenarios and Capability Planning: Creation of Scenarios as a Tool for Predicting the Future Operating Environment
transformation into attractive and understandable scenarios or alternative 
futures. Their disadvantage lies in the lack of a system of measurements 
and evaluation of analyses and predictions, and especially high influence 
of subjective evaluations by experts. Qualitative methods are particularly 
suitable for long-term predictions of a security and operating environment, 
or identification of threat or capability requirements.
Classification and Characteristics of Plausible Quantitative 
Methods
Unlike qualitative methods, quantitative methods of analysis and prediction 
of security threats and risks have the advantage of minimising subjective 
influences by using objective “hard data”, often involving statistical and 
mathematical methods, modelling, etc. Quantitative methods can be divided 
into two groups:
•	 methods based on monitoring time series, and 
•	 econometric or causal methods. 
Prediction models based on time series studies analyse the chronological 
sequences of observations of each variable (e.g., demographic or economic 
data), and are based on the assumption that the study of past values and 
their development over time can predict future values of the analysed 
variables. Causal models or econometric forecasts derive values of the 
predicted (dependent) variables from the behaviour of other (independent) 
variables. The aim of causal models is to express the relationships between 
independent variables through a mathematical formula in order to determine 
the predicted values of the dependent variable (e.g., estimate of consumption 
of strategic raw materials based on analysis and prediction of economic 
growth, technological innovation, estimated amount of resources, etc.). 
A frequently used quantitative method in the field of analysis and prediction 
of the security environment and the resulting security threats and risks 
(especially for demographic and economic development) is the method 
of extrapolation, which is based on extending the observed development 
series. The initial presumption is that the process will evolve in the same 
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direction or with the same intensity in the future. The relatively high 
value of extrapolation can be expected if we manage to formulate laws 
of development of the forecasted phenomenon or process, for example, 
through the development curve (line for linear development, such as growth, 
cyclical curve for recurring phenomena, exponential curve, etc.) and collect a 
sufficient amount of quantifiable data.
Quantitative methods and approaches are advantageous in their relative 
objectivity of outputs from the analysis and prediction, as the subjective 
element of the evaluators is eliminated. However, the demand of these 
methods lies particularly in the need for long-term, accurate and extensive 
data collection. Their use is suitable for short- or medium-term predictions, 
but increasing the time horizon of prediction decreases their accuracy and 
information value (for details see, e.g., Stojar, 2011: pp.257-258). 
Potential Use of Qualitative Methods
There are two critical areas were qualitative methods may provide 
considerable contribution. First is the assessment of policy options and 
second is the identification of capability requirements. The most suitable 
methods for these two tasks are: (1) alternative futures assessment and (2) 
scenarios development. 
Alternative futures assessment
Alternative futures methodological framework (AFMF) as a tool for 
assessment of strategic environment evolution is one of the outcomes of 
the institutional research project Strategic Alternatives for Armed Forces 
Development (STRATAL) which has been conducted by the Centre for 
Security and Military Strategic Studies in 2016. The AFMF provides an 
effective analytical method for assessing the potential development of a 
strategic environment in support of future policy formulation and strategic 
level decision making in the face of growing complexity and uncertainty. Its 
relevance has already been proven in several instances, e.g., Future Policy 
Survey in Netherlands or Future Army Capability Assessment in Canada. 
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In this regard, the AFMF might also be understood as a process for systematic 
and rigorous assessment of the ever evolving strategic landscape including 
military technology in which political masters formulate their vision and 
defence policy objectives and top military leadership designs the most 
relevant military strategy in order to fulfil these political expectations. It 
offers a sound methodological framework for strategists, defence planners 
and other stakeholders involved in strategic level decision making and 
planning in the area of national defence provision. Its main objective is to 
assist decision makers and strategic planners in addressing uncertainty and 
complexity when predicting the strategic environment and assessing its 
implications. It also could help in understanding the impact of technology 
on developing credible military capabilities in a long-term time span. This 
long-term time span deals with the configuration of Future Armed Forces 
15 to 30 years in the future. This time span allows for prudent reengineering 
of existing and planned defence posture, command and force structure 
and capabilities while taking into consideration both opportunities and 
challenges stemming from the external environment including military 
technology advancements. 
Based on alternative futures, decision makers and planners can formulate 
more flexible policies that ensure their organisations have the required agility 
to compete in whichever future, even one that is different from the futures 
envisaged. It will also help them to anticipate changes and prepare the 
organisation for dealing with future challenges as well as taking advantage of 
emerging opportunities. (Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, 2014:pp.9-
12). 
The AFMF is built on a process embracing the following 10 steps: (1) 
identification of key focus areas and potential drivers of their change, trends 
and shocks; (2) environmental scanning; (3) determination of uncertainties 
and their polarities; (4) ranking uncertainties; (5) development of alternate 
future framework; (6) writing alternative futures; (7) communicating and 
validating outcomes; (8) identifying and assessing military implications; 
(9) identifying signs – indicators; and (10) monitoring results – assessing 
implementation and updating if required. (Canadian Army Land Warfare 
Centre, 2015:pp.23-24). Key focus areas are critical for investigating plausible 
76
Libor Frank and Josef Procházka
defence policy and military strategy options. They may embrace politics, 
economics, social dimensions, science and technology, environment, legal 
domain, security, human domain and military (NATO, 2015:pp.70-75). Key 
change drivers are variables that have the potential to change the future 
in a significant way but are not very predictable as they are themselves 
dependent on several factors, e.g., oil price.
Environment scanning must ensure undirected viewing (peripheral vision 
– to see and think outside the box), conditioned viewing (trends and early 
warnings about emerging issues), identification of the organisation’s main 
features and assessment of its impact (identification and presentation of 
secondary and tertiary consequences of trends and events).
Ranking uncertainties and their polarities indicate opportunities and 
threats stemming from the external environment. The following is a set of 
examples for consideration: (1) impact of age and demographics on military 
force composition (ageing population and population growth and younger 
societies); (2) energy security (surpluses vs. deficiencies); (3) exponential 
technology growth (development and innovation accepted vs. opposed). 
We can apply the impact and uncertainty matrix. This entails assessment of 
the future importance of key change drivers to the decision arena and the 
degree of uncertainty that exists about future outcomes and an impact each 
force will have in shaping the future of the key decision factors and how 
important it will be in determining the differences among the alternative 
futures that are developed. 
Alternate futures framework is created by selecting two trends, such as 
those with critical uncertainties, in the form of a simple 2x2 matrix with 
these trends as the axes. An illustrative example (see Figure 1) demonstrates 
that the alternative futures are defined by whether trend one moves to high 
transparency or low transparency, and whether at the same time trend two 
moves to uncontrolled access to technology or regulated access to technology.
As a result, we have a simple cross of alternative futures. Each of the four 
quadrants represents a distinct alternative, as the outcome of combining 
either/or options of the selected trends. The alternative futures (policies) will 
be named, further elaborated and their impact will be assessed. The following 
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process entails more detailed and structured planning, implementation, 
monitoring of outcomes and if needed the process might be updated.
Figure 1 – Alternative Future Cross 
Development of alternative futures is a growing international discipline 
designed to critically examine the difficulties associated with making 
decisions with long-term future consequences in conditions of uncertainty 
(Chermack, 2011:pp.136-142). It provides a methodological framework 
through which these challenges can be handled and their negative impact on 
decision making reasonably mitigated (Plausible Futures Newsletter, 2007).
Scenarios development
Scenarios mentioned above are used for identification and verification of 
capability requirements, in particular. Scenarios depict the main features 
of the environment in which the armed forces will be employed to execute 
military missions. 
Low transparency
Future 1 Future 2






   
   







Access to technology regulated
Uncontrolled access to technology
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Table 1. Best Practices Scenarios Design Methodology for Capability Planning
Strategic Analysis
↓
Security Environment – Security Challenges and Risks 
Operational Environment and Application of Military Power
Technology











Collective Defence (Article 5 Ops)
Air Defence, Cyber Defence
Crisis Response Operations (multinational effort)
Operation under National Command





Political and Military End State
Strategic Objectives and Effects
Operational Objectives and Effects
Key Tasks = Capability Requirements
Specific Scenario I Geography
Specific operational conditions including enemy
Specific Scenario II Geography
Specific operational conditions including enemy
Resource: Outcome of Research Project STRATAL. Centre for Security and Military Strategic 
Studies of Defence University in Brno (The Czech Republic).
Scenarios also reflect operational concepts in the sense of doctrinal use of 
armed forces. Furthermore, they offer a possibility to identify and quantify 
required capabilities in a volatile, difficult to predict, complex, permanently 
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and dynamically changing operating environment, and reduce the level of 
uncertainty and associated risks. In this regard, scenarios are significant 
analytical and supporting tools of defence planning with high added 
value. Correct application of scenarios allows for defining a set of required 
capabilities necessary for success in potential future conflicts. Also, Davis 
(2002) has written that scenarios enable long-term planning of capabilities 
development and optimisation as a platform for qualified and well-informed 
decisions at the strategic level for the armed forces’ character, structure and 
size with regard to the ambitions and international commitments of the 
country.
Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of Defence University in 
Brno (Czech Republic) conducted research examining the methodology for 
scenarios design in order to facilitate identification of capability requirements 
and rigorous validation of existing and planned capabilities. Depicted in the 
Table 1 is the best practice methodology derived from the assessment of 
several models (e.g. NATO, EU, Germany, UK, NL and US; see also, Kříž, 
2015: p.117; Ministry of Defence Netherlands, 2010). 
Methodology entails analysis of strategic environments, political guidance 
and type of operation. Based on that, a generic scenario is developed 
comprising political and military end state allowing for the mission to 
be subject to task decomposition. Identified tasks define the functional 
capability requirement needs. According to Procházka et al. (2016: p.46), for 
validation purposes generic scenarios are placed in a specific geographical 
location allowing for assessment of capability requirements against specific 
operational characteristics and concrete enemy.
Conclusion
High quality analysis and prediction of a security and operating environment 
and its potential implications for policy formulation and capability 
development is an ongoing and ever more refined process. Its aim is not 
an accurate description of reality at a future date, but the choice of the most 
probable development options based on today’s information. It draws 
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attention to important factors, events or constraints that will be important 
in the future and helps achieve more precise targeting, higher efficiency 
and lower costs of security and defence policy. Additionally, alternative 
futures assessment and scenarios development provide a suitable analytical 
framework for identification of policy options and capability requirements 
under increasing levels of uncertainty and complexity in the external 
environment. The described methodological frameworks were developed by 
the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies and customised for a 
well-informed and evidence-based decision-making process at the strategic 
level within the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic.  
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